ShortcomingsThis post is really not about the shortcomings of NASA, it’s more about the inevitability poor, high cost deliverables when a) an organization looses its focus because of a constantly changing Vision and Mission; b) a development process fo…
In a recent post I briefly discussed the changes in roles and emphasis when a development or transformation effort changes from a waterfall (Big Bang) effort to a short cycle-agile effort. This post will discuss the topic in more detail in terms …
In the late 1990s, the US Congress mandated that all Federal Departments must have an Enterprise Architecture to purchase new IT equipment and software. The thrust of the reasoning was that a Department should have an overall plan, which makes a good deal of sense. I suspect the term “Enterprise Architecture” to denote the unification of the supporting tooling, though they could have used “Enterprise IT Engineering” in the manner of Manufacturing Engineering, which unifies the processes, procedures, functions, and methods of the assembly line. And yet, Enterprise Architecture means something more, as embodied the the Federal Enterprise Architecture Framework (FEAF). The architecture team that created this framework to recognize that processes, systems, and other tooling must support the organization’s Vision and Mission. However, its up to the organization and Enterprise Architect to implement processes that can populate and use the data in the framework effectively. And that’s the rub.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s the DoD referred to armed drones as Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs), then in the later 2000s, they changed the name of the concept to Unmanned Combat Air Systems (UCAS). Why?
There are three reasons having to do with a change in western culture, the most difficult changes for any organization. These are: 1) a change from linear process understanding to linear and cyclic, 2) a change from thinking about a set of functions to understanding a function as part of a process, and a change in thinking from product to system.
Product thinking is creating something in a temporally linear fashion, that is, creating a product has a start and an end. D. Boorstin in the first section of his book, The Discovers, discusses the evolution of the concept of time, from its cyclic origins through the creation of a calendar to the numbering of years, to the concept of history as a sequence of events. To paraphrase Boorstin, for millennia all human thinking and human society was ruled by the yearly and monthly cycles of nature. Gradually, likely starting with the advent of clans and villages a vague concept of a linear series of events formed. Still, the cycles of life are still at the core of most societies (e.g., in the east, the Hindu cycles, and the Chinese year, and in the West, Christmas and New Years, and various national holidays).
The concept of history change cultural thinking from cycles to a progression through a series of linear temporal events (events in time that don’t repeat and cause other events to occur). In several centuries this concept of history permeated Western Culture. The concept of history broke and flattened the temporal cycles into a flat line of events. With this concept and with data, information, and knowledge, in the form of books, meant that Western culture now had the ability to fully understand the concept of progress. Adam Smith applied this concept to manufacturing, in the form of a process, which divided the process into functions (events), and which ended up producing many more products from the same inputs of raw materials, labor, and tooling.
Function vs Process
Adam Smith did this by using a very simple example, the making of straight pins. In this example he demonstrated that eight men each serving in a specialized function could make more than 10 times the number of pins in a day when compared with each of the men performing all the functions. He called it the division of labor; we call it “functional specialization“.
Functional specialization of skills and tooling permeates Western Culture and has led to greater wealth production than any prior concept that has been created. Consequently, as Western Civilization accreted knowledge, the researchers, engineering, and skilled workers became more expert in their specialized function and increasingly less aware of the rest of the process.
Currently, most organizations are structured by function, HR, accounting, contracts, finance, marketing or business development, and so on. In manufacturing there are designers (detailed design engineers), engineers (analysts of the design), manufacturing engineers and other Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). Each of these functions vie with one another for funding to better optimize their particular function. And most organizations allocate funding to these functions (or sometimes groups of functions) for the type of optimization.
Unfortunately, allocating funds by function is a very poor way to allocate funds. There is a principle in Systems Engineering that, “Optimizing the sub-systems, sub-optimizes the system“. J.B. Quinn, in “Managing Innovation: Controlled Chaos”, (Harvard Business Review, May-June 1985), demonstrated this principle, as shown in Figure 1.
Influenced by the Wealth of Nations, from about 1800 on, industries, first in Britain, then across the Western world, and finally globally, used Adam Smith’s concept of a process as an assembly line of functions to create more real value than humankind had ever produced before. But this value was in the form of products–things. Developing new “things” is a linear process. It starts with an idea, an invention, or an innovation. Continues with product development to initial production and marketing. Finally, if successful, there is a ramp up of production, which continues until superseded by a new product. This is the Waterfall Process Model.
The organization that manufactured the product had only the obligation to ensure that the product would meet the specifications the organization advertised at the time the customer purchased the product, and in a very few cases, early in the product’s life cycle. Generally, these specifications were so general, so non-specific, and so opaque that the manufacturing company could not be held responsible. In fact, a good many companies that are over 100 years old, exist only because they actually supported their product and its specifications. Their customers turned into their advertising agency.
This model is good for development (what some call product realization) and transformation projects, but the model has two fatal flaws, long term. The first (as I discuss in my post Systems Engineering, Product/System/Service Implementing, and Program Management) is that the waterfall process is based on the assumption that “All of the requirements have been identified up front“; a heroic assumption to say the least (and generally completely invalid). The second has equal impact and was caused by the transportation and communications systems of the 1700s to the 1950s. This flaw is that “Once the product leaves of the factory it is no longer the concern of the manufacturer.”
This second flaw in historical/straight line/waterfall thinking effects both the customer and the supplier. The customer had and has a hard time keeping the product maintained. For example, most automobile companies in the 1890s did not have dealerships with service departments; in fact they did not have dealerships, as such. Instead, most automobiles were purchased by going to the factory or ordering by mail. And even today, most automobile manufacturers don’t fully consider the implications of disposal when design a vehicle. So they are thinking of an automobile as a product not a system or system of systems (which would include the road system and the fuel production and distribution systems. The flavor of this for the United States is in its disposable economic thinking; in everything from diapers to houses (yes, houses…many times people are purchasing houses in the US housing slump, knocking them down, to build larger much more expensive housing…at least in some major metropolitan areas). Consequently, nothing is built to last, but is a consumable product.
Systems Thinking and The Wheel of Progress
Since the 1960s, there has been a very slow, but growing trend toward cyclic thinking with organizations. Some of this is due to the impact of the environmental movement, and ecosystems models. More of this change in thinking is due to the realization that there really is a “wheel of progress”. Like a wheel on a cart, the wheel of progress goes through cycles to move forward.
The “cycle” of the “wheel of progress” is the OODA Loop Process, that is, Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) loop. The actual development or transformation of a system occurs during the “Act” function. This can be either a straight-line, “waterfall-like” process or a short-cycle “RAD-like” process. However, only when the customer observes the of the transformed system in operation, orients the results of the observation of the system in operation to the organization’s Vision and Mission to determine if it is being effective and cost efficient, then deciding to act or not during the rest of the cycle. The key difference between product and systems thinking is that each “Act” function is followed by an “Observe” function. In other words, there is a feedback loop to ensure that the output from the process creates the benefits required and that any defects in the final product are caught and rectified in the next cycle before the defect causes harm. For example, Ford treated is Bronco SUV as a product rather than a system. “Suddenly”, tire blowouts on the SUV contributed to accidents, in some of which the passengers were killed. If Ford had treated the Bronco as a system, rather than a product, and kept metrics on problems that the dealers found, then they might have caught the problem much earlier. Again, last year, Toyota, also treating their cars as products rather than systems, found a whole series of problems.
OODA Loop velocity
USAF Col. John Boyd, creator of the OODA Loop felt that the key to success in both aerial duels and on the battlefield is that the velocity through the OODA Loop cycle was faster than your opponent’s. Others have found that this works with businesses and other organizations as well. This is the seminal reason to go to short cycle development and transformation. Short cycle in this case would be 1 to 3 months, rather than the “yearly planning cycle” of most organizations. Consequently, all observations, orientation and deciding should be good enough, not develop for the optimal, there isn’t one. [this follows the military axiom that Grant, Lee, Jackson, and even Patton followed “Doing something now is always better than doing the right thing later”.] Expect change because not all of the requirements are known, and even if they are known, the technological and organizational (business) environment will change within one to three months. But remember the organization’s Mission, and especially its Vision, change little over time; therefore the performance the metrics, the metrics that measure how optimal the current systems and proposed changes are, will change little. So these metrics are the guides in this environment of continuous change. Plan and implement for upgrade and change, not stability–this is the essence of an agile systems.
This is true of hardware systems as well as software. For example, in 1954, Haworth Office Furniture started building movable wall partitions to create offices. Steel Case and Herman Miller followed suit in the early 1960s. At that point, businesses and other organizations could lease all or part of a floor of an office building. As the needs of the organization changed these partitions could be reconfigured. This made for agile office space, or office systems (and the bane of most office workers, the cubicle), but allows the organization to make most effective and cost efficient use of the space it has available.
The Role of the Systems Engineering Disciplines
There are significant consequences for the structure of an organization that is attempting to be highly responsive to the challenges and opportunities presented to it, while in its process for achieving its Mission and Vision in a continuously changing operational and technical environment. It has to operate and transform itself in an environment that is much more like basketball (continuous play) than American football (discrete plays from the scrimmage line with its downs)–apologies to any international readers for this analogy. This requires continuous cyclic transformation (system transformation) as opposed to straight line transformation (product development).
Treating Process in Product Thinking Terms
Starting in the 1980s, after the publication of Quality is Free, by Phil Crosby in 1979, the quality movement and quality circles, the concept of Integrated Product Teams (IPTs, which some changed to Integrated Product and Process Teams, IPPTs) organizations have been attempts to move from a focus on product thinking toward a focus on system thinking). Part of this was in response to the Japanese lean process methods, stemming in part from the work of Edward Deming and others. First international attempt to is ISO 9000 quality Product Thinking (starting in 2002), though in transition to Systems thinking, since it is a one time straight-through (Six Sigma) methodology, starting with identifying a process or functional problem and ending with a change in the process, function, or supporting system.
Other attempts at systems thinking were an outgrowth of this emphasis on producing quality products (product thinking). For example, the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) approach, conceptualized in 1987. The BSC was attempting to look at all dimensions of an organization by measuring multiple dimensions. It uses four dimensions to measure the performance of an organization and its management instead of measure the performance of an organization on more than the financial dimension. The Software Engineering Institute (SEI) built layer four, measurement, into the Capability Maturity Model for the same purpose.
In 1990, Michael Hammer began to create the discipline of Business Process Reengineering (BPR), followed by others like Tom Peters and Peter Drucker. This discipline treats the process as a process rather than as a series of functions. It is more like the Manufacturing Engineering discipline that seeks to optimize the processes with respect to cost efficiency per unit produced. For example, Michael Hammer would say that no matter size of an organization, it’s books can closed at the end of each day, not by spending two weeks at the end of the business or fiscal year “closing the books”. Or in another example, you can tell if an organization is focused on functions or processes by its budgeting model; either a process budgeting model or a functional budgeting model.
Like the Lean concept, and to some degree, ISO 9000, ITIL,and other standards, BPR does little to link to the organization’s Vision and Mission, as Jim Collins discusses in Built to Last (2002); or as he puts the BHAG, BIG HARRY AUDACIOUS GOALS. Instead, it focuses on cost efficiency (cost reduction through reducing both waste and organizational friction, one type of waste) within the business processes.
System Architecture Thinking and the Enterprise Architect
In 1999, work started on the Federal Enterprise Architecture Framework (FEAF) with a very traditional four layer architecture, business process, application, data, and technology. In 2001, a new version was released that included a fifth layer, the Performance Reference Model. For the first time the FEAF links all of the organization’s processes and enabling and supporting technology to its Vision and Mission. Further, if properly implemented, it can do this in a measurable manner (see my post Transformation Benefits Measurement, the Political and Technical Hard Part of Mission Alignment and Enterprise Architecture). This enables the Enterprise Architect to perform in the role that I have discussed in several of my posts and in comments in some of the groups in the LinkedIn site. These are decision support for investment decision-making processes and support for the governance and policy management processes (additionally, I see the Enterprise Architect as responsible for the Technology Change Management process for reasons that I discuss in Technology Change Management: An Activity of the Enterprise Architect). Further, successful organizations will use a Short Cycle investment decision-making (Mission Alignment) and implementing (Mission Implementation) process, for reasons discussed above. [Sidebar: there may be a limited number of successful project that need multiple years to complete. For example, large buildings, new designs for an airframe of aircraft, large ships–all very large construction effort, while some like construction or reconstruction of highways can be short cycle efforts–much to the joy of the motoring public.] The Enterprise Architect (EA), using the OODA Loop pattern, has continuous measured feedback as the change operates. Given that there will be a learning curve for all changes in operation; still, the Enterprise Architect is in the best position to provide guidance as to what worked and what other changes are needed to further optimize the organization’s processes and tooling to support its Mission and Vision. Additionally, because the EA is accountable for the Enterprise Architecture, he or she has the perspective of entire organization’s processes and tooling, rather than just a portion and is in the position to make recommendations on investments and governance.
System Architecture Thinking and the Systems Engineer and System Architect
One consequence of the short-cycle processes is that all short-cycle efforts are “level of effort” based. Level of Effort is a development or transformation effort is executed using a given a set level of resources over the entire period of the effort. Whereas in a waterfall-like “Big Bang” process scheduling the resources to support the effort is a key responsibility of the effort (and the PM), with the short-cycle the work must fit into the cycles. With the waterfall, the PM could schedule all of the work by adding resources or lengthened the time required to design, develop, implement and verify; now the work must fit into a given time and level of resource. Now, the PM can’t do either because they are held constant.
If, in order to make an agile process, we use axiom that “Not all of the requirements are known at the start of the effort”, rather than the other way around, then any scheduling of work beyond the current cycle is an exercise in futility because as the number of known requirements increases, some of the previously unknown requirements will be of higher priority for the customer than any of the known requirements. Since a Mission of a supplier is to satisfy the needs of the customer, each cycle will work on the highest priority requirements, which means that some or many of the known requirements will be “below the line” on each cycle. The final consequence of this is that some of the originally known requirements will not be met by the final product. Instead, the customer will get the organization’s highest priority requirements fulfilled. I have found that when this is the case, the customer is more delighted with the product, takes greater ownership of the product, and finds resources to continue with the lower priority requirements.
On the other hand, not fulfilling all on the initially known requirements (some of which were not real requirements, some of which contradicted other requirements) gives PMs, the contracts department, accountants, lawyers, and other finance engineers the pip! Culturally,generally they are incapable of dealing in this manner; their functions are not built to handle it when the process is introduced. Fundamentally making the assumption that “Not all the requirements are known up front” makes the short-cycle development process Systems Requirements-based instead of Programmatic Requirements-based. This is the major stumbling block to the introduction of this type of process because it emphasizes the roles of the Systems Engineer and System Architect and de-emphasizes the role of the PM.
The customer too, must become accustomed to the concept, though in my experience on many efforts, the once the customer unders the customer’s role in this process, the customer becomes delighted. I had one very high-level customer that said after the second iteration through one project, “I would never do any IT effort again that does not use this process.”
A Pattern for Development and Transformation Efforts
Consequently, as shown in Figure 1, I call this process pattern “The Three-legged Stool” pattern for development and transformation. I will discuss each sub-process as a role with requirements. Therefore, this is what I see as the needs or requirements for the process and the skills for the role. In my next book, I will discuss more about how these can be done.
- Requirements Identification, Management, and Verification/Validation (see various other posts as well)
- Risk Management
- Configuration Management
There is a significant issue with designers and implementers, they attempt to create the “best” product ever and go into a never ending set of design cycles. Like the Systems Engineering “analysis paralysis”, this burns budget and time without producing a deliverable for the customer. One part of this problem is that the SMEs too often forget is that they are developing or transforming against as set of requirements (The “What’s Needed“). In the hundreds of small, medium, and large efforts in which I’ve been involved, I would say that the overwhelming percentage of time, the SMEs never read the customer’s requirements because they understand the process, procedure, function, or method far better than the customer. Therefore, they implement a product/system/service that does not do what the customer wants, but does do many functions that the customer does not want. Then the defect management process takes over to rectify these two; which blows the budget and schedule entirely, while making the customer unhappy, to say the least. The second part of this problem is that each SME role is convinced that their role is key to the effort. Consequently, they develop their portion to maximize its internal efficiency while completely neglecting the effectiveness of the product/system/service. While I may be overstating this part somewhat, at least half the time, I’ve seen efforts where, security for example, attempts to create the equivalent of “write only memory”; the data on it can never be used because the memory cannot be read from. This too, burns budget and schedule while adding no value.
Again, I will discuss solutions to this issue in the last two sections of this post.
- “The best of all leaders is the one who helps people so that, eventually, they don’t need him.
- Then comes the one they love and admire.
- Then comes the one they fear.
- The worst is the one who lets people push him around.
The Way This Works Today: The Program Management Control Pattern
The first way is to give control of the effort to manager. This is the “traditional” approach and the way most organization’s run development and transformation efforts . The effort’s manager manages the customer’s programmatic requirements, (budget and schedule), so the manager plans out the effort including its schedule. This project plan is based on “the requirements”, most often plan includes “requirements analysis”.
[Rant 1, sorry about this: My question has always been, “How is it possible to plan a project based on requirements when the first task is to analyze the requirements to determine the real requirements?” AND, I have seen major efforts (hundreds of millions to billions) which had no real requirements identified…Huh?]
The Program or Project Manager tells the Systems Engineer and Developer/Implementer when each task is complete; because that’s when the time and or money for that task on the schedule is done, regardless of the quality of the work products from the task. “Good” managers keep a “management reserve” in case things don’t go as planned. Often, if nothing is going as planned, the manager’s knee jerk reaction is to “replan”; which means creating an inch-stone schedule. I’ve seen and been involved in large efforts where the next level of detail would be to schedule “bathroom breaks”. This method for resolution of “analysis paralysis” and “design the best” will almost inevitably cause cost and schedule overruns, unhappy customers, and defective products because the effort’s control function to control costs and schedules.
The Program Management Control Pattern
Figure 2 shows the Program Management Control Pattern. The size of the elipse shows the percieved importance of each of the three roles.
To be able to “Control” the effort, the Program Manager requires many intermediate artifacts, schedules, budgets, and status reports, which use up the resources of the efforts and are non-valued work products, the customer might look at these artifacts once during a PMR, PDR, CDR, or other “XDR” (Rant 2: Calling these review Program Management Reviews, instead of some type of Design Review”, Preliminary, Critical, etc., demonstrates the overwhelming perceived importance of the programmatic requirements by Program Managers.) I submit that all of these intermediate artifacts are non-value added because 3 months after the effort is completed, the customer or anyone else will not look at any of them except if the customer is suing the the development or transformation organization over the poor quality of the product. All of these management reviews require resources from the Developers/Implementers and the Systems Engineers.
One extreme example of this management review procedure was the procedures used in development of new aircraft for the US Air Force and Navy during the 1980s and 90s–sometimes facts are stranger than fantasy. The DoD required some type of “Development Review” every 3 months. Typically, these were week-long reviews with a large customer team descending on the aircraft’s Prime Contractor. Program Management (perhaps, rightly) considered these of ultimate importance to keeping the contract and therefore wanted everyone ready. Consequently, all hands on the effort stopped work 2 weeks prior to work on status reports and presentation rehearsals. Then, after the “review” all hands would spend most of an additional week reviewing the customer’s feedback and trying to replan the effort to resolve issues and reduce risk. If you add this up, the team was spending 1 month in every 3 on status reporting. And I have been part of information technology efforts, in this day of instant access to everything on a project where essentially the same thing is happening. Think about it, these aircraft programs spent one third of their budget, and lengthened the programs by 1/3 just for status for what? Intermediate artifacts of no persistent value–Who looked at the presentations of the first Preliminary Design Review after the aircraft was put into operations? [Rant 3: Did the American citizen get value for the investment or was this just another Program Management Entitlement Program funded by the DoD?]
Second, as shown in Figure 2, the Systems Engineering role is substantially reduced in the perception of the Program Manager. An example of this was brought home to me on a multi-billion program, when I asked the chief engineer where the requirements were stored, he quoted the Program’s Director as saying, “We don’t need no damn requirements, we’re too busy doing the work.” This Director underlined this thinking; he kept hiring more program management, schedule planners, earned value analysts, and so on, while continuous reducing then eliminating the entire Systems Engineering team and leaving only a few System Architects. He justified this by the need to increased control and cost reduction to meet his budget [Rant 4: and therefore to get his “management bonus”–no one ever heard of the Design or a System Engineering Bonus]. Actually, I’ve seen this strategy put into play on large (more than $20M) three programs with which I was associated and I’ve heard about it on several more within the organization I was work for and in other organizations, over the past 10 years.
Another program that I worked on as the Lead Systems Engineer that had the same perception of the Systems Engineer (including the System Architect’s role within the Systems Engineering discipline/role). It is an extreme example of all that can go wrong because of lack of Systems Engineering. This effort was development of a portal capability for the organization. It started with a that had 10 management personnel and myself. They articulated a series of ill-thought-out capability statements, continued by defining a series products that had to be used (with no not identification of Customer System or IT Functional requirements), with a 6 weeks schedule, and ended with a budget that was 50 percent of what even the most optimistic budgeteers could “guessitmate”. They (the three or four levels of management represented at the meeting) charged me with the equivalent of “Making bricks without straw or mud in the dark”, that is, creating the portal. Otherwise, my chances of getting on the Reduction In Force (RIF) list would be drastically increased.
Given that charge, I immediately contacted the software supplier and the development team members from two successful efforts within the organization to determine if there was any hope of the effort within the programmatic constraints to accomplish the task. All three agreed, it could not be done in less than 6 months. Faced with this overwhelming and documented evidence, they asked me what can be done. The result was based on their “capability” statements, and “Requirements (?)” documents from the other two projects, I was able to cobble together a System Architecture Document (SAD) that these managers could point to as visible progress. Additionally, I used a home grown risk tool to document risks as I bumped into them. Additionally, I instituted a risk watch list report on a weekly basis, which all the managers ignored.
At this point one fiscal year ended and with the new year, I was able to have the whole, nationwide, team get together, in part, to get everyones requirements and design constraints. Additionally, I presented an implementation plan for the capabilities I understood they needed. This plan included segmenting the functions for an IOC build in May, followed by several additional several additional builds. Since this management team was used to the waterfall development process, the rejected this with no consideration; they wanted it all by May 15th. In turn, I gave them a plan for producing, more or less, an acceptable number of functions, and an associated risk report with a large number of high probability/catastrophic impact risks. They accepted the plan. The plan failed; here is an example of why.
One of the risks was getting the hardware for the staging and production systems in by March 15th. I submitted the Bill of Materials (BOM) to the PM the first week in February. The suppliers of the hardware that I recommended indicated that the hardware would be shipped within 7 days of the time the order was received. When I handed the BOM to the PM, I also indicated the risk if we didn’t get the systems by March 15th. On March 1st, I told him that we would have a day for day slippage in the schedule for every day we didn’t receive the hardware. The long and the short of it was that I was called on the carpet for a wire brushing on July 28th when we had the program held up because of lack of hardware. Since I could show the high-level manager that, in fact, I had reported the risk (then issue) week after week in the risk report she received, her ire finally turned on the PM, who felt he had the responsibility.
The net result of these and several other risks induced either by lack of requirements or lack of paying attention to risks resulted in a system that was ready for staging the following December. Management took it upon themselves to roll the portal into production without the verification and validation testing. The final result was a total failure of the effort due to management issues coming from near the top of the management pyramid. Again, this was due to a complete lack of understanding of the role of Systems Engineering and Architecture. In fact, this is a minor sample of the errors and issues–maybe I will write a post on this entire effort as an example of what not to do.
In fact the DoD has acknowledged the pattern shown in Figure 2 and countered it by creating System Engineering Technical Advisory (SETA) contracts.
The Utility of Program Management
None of the latter three types of leaders, as described by Lao Tzu, can perform perform this service to the team, the ones I call in my book, the Charismatic, the Dictator, or the Incompetent. In other words, the PM can’t say and act as if “The floggings will continue until morale improves”.
Instead, the PM must be a leader of the first type as described by Lao Tzu and as I called in my book as “the coach or conductor”. And any team member can be that leader. As a Lead Developer and as a Systems Engineer, I’ve run medium sized projects without a program manager and been highly successful–success in this case being measured by bringing the effort in under cost, ahead of schedule, while meeting or exceeding the customers requirements Yet, on those none of the programs, for which I was the lead systems engineer and which had a program manager and who’s mission was to bring in the effort on time and within budget, was successful. On the other hand, I’ve been on two programs where the PM listened with his/her ears rather than his/her month and both paid attention to the System Requirements; those efforts were highly successful.
The net of this is that a coaching/conducting PM can make a good team better, but cannot make a bad team good, while a PM in creating better projects plans, producing better and more frequent status reports, and creating and managing to more detailed schedules will always burn budget and push the schedule to the right.
- If a development or transformation effort focuses on meeting the customer’s system requirements, the effort has a much better chance of success than if the focus is on meeting the programmatic requirements.
- If the single fundamental assumption is changed from “All the requirements are known up front” to “Not all the requirements are known up front” the effort has the opportunity to be successful or much more successful by the only metric that counts, the customer is getting more of what he or she wants, and that increases customer satisfaction.
- If the development or transformation effort can roll out small increments will increase the customer’s ROI for the product, system, or service.
- Having a Program Manager, who’s only independent responsibility is managing resources be accountable for an effort is like having the CEO of an organization report to the CFO; you get cost efficient, but not effective products, systems, or services. [Final Rant: I know good PMs have value, but if a team works, that is because the PM is a leader of the first type: a coach and conductor.] Having a Program Manager that understands the “three legged stool” pattern for development or transformation, and who executes to it will greatly enhance the chance for success of the effort.