systemsthinking

We Ought to Know the Difference

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Is systems thinking really possible? Here’s one reason why it might not be.

One of the concerns of systems thinking is the need to avoid the so-called environmental fallacy – the blunder of ignoring or not understanding the effects of the environment of a system. This is why, when systems thinkers are asked to tackle a concrete situation in detail, they often hesitate, insisting that it is wrong to look at the detail before understanding the context.

The trouble with this is that there is always a larger context, so this hesitation leads to an infinite regress and inability to formulate practical inroads into a complex situation. Many years ago, I read a brilliant essay by J.P. Eberhard called “We Ought to Know the Difference”, which contains a widely quoted example of a doorknob. As I recall, Eberhard’s central question is a practical one – how do we know when to expand the scope of the problem, and how do we know when to stop.

C West Churchman went more deeply into this question. In his book The Systems Approach and its Enemies (1979), he presents an ironic picture of the systems thinker as hero.

If the intellect is to engage in the heroic adventure of securing improvement in the human condition, it cannot rely on “approaches,” like politics and morality, which attempt to tackle problems head-on, within the narrow scope. Attempts to address problems in such a manner simply lead to other problems, to an amplification of difficulty away from real improvement. Thus the key to success in the hero’s attempt seems to be comprehensiveness. Never allow the temptation to be clear, or to use reliable data, or to “come up to the standards of excellence,” divert you from the relevant, even though the relevant may be elusive, weakly supported by data, and requiring loose methods.

Like Eberhard, Churchman seeks to reconcile the heroic stance of the systems thinker with the practical stance of other approaches. But we ought to know the difference.

This is an extract from my eBook on Next Practice Enterprise Architecture. Draft available from LeanPub.

John P. Eberhard, “We Ought to Know the Difference,” Emerging Methods in Environmental Design and Planning, Gary T. Moore, ed. (MIT Press, 1970) pp 364-365

See extract here – The Warning of the Doorknob. The same extract can be found in many places, including Ed Yourdon’s Modern Structured Analysis (first published 1989).

See also

Nicholas Berente, C West Churchman: Champion of the Systems Approach

Jeff Lindsay, Avoiding environmental fallacy with systems thinking (December 2012)

Updated May 14 2013

We Ought to Know the Difference

by

Is systems thinking really possible? Here’s one reason why it might not be.

One of the concerns of systems thinking is the need to avoid the so-called environmental fallacy – the blunder of ignoring or not understanding the effects of the environment of a system. This is why, when systems thinkers are asked to tackle a concrete situation in detail, they often hesitate, insisting that it is wrong to look at the detail before understanding the context.

The trouble with this is that there is always a larger context, so this hesitation leads to an infinite regress and inability to formulate practical inroads into a complex situation. Many years ago, I read a brilliant essay by J.P. Eberhard called “We Ought to Know the Difference”, which contains a widely quoted example of a doorknob. As I recall, Eberhard’s central question is a practical one – how do we know when to expand the scope of the problem, and how do we know when to stop.

C West Churchman went more deeply into this question. In his book The Systems Approach and its Enemies (1979), he presents an ironic picture of the systems thinker as hero.

If the intellect is to engage in the heroic adventure of securing improvement in the human condition, it cannot rely on “approaches,” like politics and morality, which attempt to tackle problems head-on, within the narrow scope. Attempts to address problems in such a manner simply lead to other problems, to an amplification of difficulty away from real improvement. Thus the key to success in the hero’s attempt seems to be comprehensiveness. Never allow the temptation to be clear, or to use reliable data, or to “come up to the standards of excellence,” divert you from the relevant, even though the relevant may be elusive, weakly supported by data, and requiring loose methods.

Like Eberhard, Churchman seeks to reconcile the heroic stance of the systems thinker with the practical stance of other approaches. But we ought to know the difference.

This is an extract from my eBook on Next Practice Enterprise Architecture. Draft available from LeanPub.

John P. Eberhard, “We Ought to Know the Difference,” Emerging Methods in Environmental Design and Planning, Gary T. Moore, ed. (MIT Press, 1970) pp 364-365

See extract here – The Warning of the Doorknob. The same extract can be found in many places, including Ed Yourdon’s Modern Structured Analysis (first published 1989).

See also

Nicholas Berente, C West Churchman: Champion of the Systems Approach

Jeff Lindsay, Avoiding environmental fallacy with systems thinking (December 2012)

Updated May 14 2013

Are we making progress?

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In a great post, @JohnQShift explains how to build a culture of learning in your business. He calls this A Matter of Life or Death (Feb 2013)

In the post, John reports one of his clients observing that they had made some progress in their business over the year.  By progress, the client meant that

  • people were beginning to take up more responsibility and initiative without having to wait for the boss to tell them what to do

  • there was more discussion amongst the staff as to how to manage some of the day-to-day challenges they meet and less referring to the boss for the “answer”

  • mistakes were being used as entry points to examining business processes and working out how they could be improved

  • they had a clearer idea of their collective purpose and how important relationship is to achieving that purpose

  • the leaders were devoting more of their time to ensuring the conditions and structures of the business were optimised so that people could get on with their jobs (and less time micro-managing operational tasks).

Read more »

Are we making progress?

by

In a great post, @JohnQShift explains how to build a culture of learning in your business. He calls this A Matter of Life or Death (Feb 2013)

In the post, John reports one of his clients observing that they had made some progress in their business over the year.  By progress, the client meant that

  • people were beginning to take up more responsibility and initiative without having to wait for the boss to tell them what to do

  • there was more discussion amongst the staff as to how to manage some of the day-to-day challenges they meet and less referring to the boss for the “answer”

  • mistakes were being used as entry points to examining business processes and working out how they could be improved

  • they had a clearer idea of their collective purpose and how important relationship is to achieving that purpose

  • the leaders were devoting more of their time to ensuring the conditions and structures of the business were optimised so that people could get on with their jobs (and less time micro-managing operational tasks).

Read more »

The Price of Fish

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Michael Mainelli and Ian Harris have written a wide-ranging survey of economics, choice theory (game theory, psychology and ethics), systems theory, chaos theory, global warming and evolution. So what’s all that got to do with the price of fish?

One of the themes running through the book is that the price of fish bears no relation to the value of fish, especially if we are concerned about long-term value and the sustainability of fish stocks.

Oscar Wilde famously defined a cynic as one who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing. This definition has also been applied to accountants and economists. Michael and Ian are leaders of the Long Finance initiative, a movement within the City of London that aims to overcome this kind of short-term financial cynicism.

Michael and Ian describe the price of fish as a wicked problem – a problem that lacks easy definition as well as easy answers.  “Sustaining the supply of edible fish is a wicked problem that presents global risks.” (p 301) And yet they suggest that the system might possibly sort itself out. “As fish run out and have to be sustainably fished, the historic underpricing of fish ceases.” (293)

But this is no time for naive optimism, and the system will undoubtedly need some intervention. “When the price is the same as the value, there are opportunities for sustainable financing. So far, price has not equaled value for fish. This is the biggest, wicked decision-making problem of all: knowing how to set a price that equals the value.” (p 295)

In other words, the problem is not just the alarming dwindling of fish stocks but the collective cynicism that not only led to this problem but also amplifies it and resists dealing with it effectively. The key word in the problem statement is the word “set” – even if a few clever people can agree what the right price of fish should be, the real challenge is to set this price into global trading and consumption systems.

Read more »

The Price of Fish

by

Michael Mainelli and Ian Harris have written a wide-ranging survey of economics, choice theory (game theory, psychology and ethics), systems theory, chaos theory, global warming and evolution. So what’s all that got to do with the price of fish?

One of the themes running through the book is that the price of fish bears no relation to the value of fish, especially if we are concerned about long-term value and the sustainability of fish stocks.

Oscar Wilde famously defined a cynic as one who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing. This definition has also been applied to accountants and economists. Michael and Ian are leaders of the Long Finance initiative, a movement within the City of London that aims to overcome this kind of short-term financial cynicism.

Michael and Ian describe the price of fish as a wicked problem – a problem that lacks easy definition as well as easy answers.  “Sustaining the supply of edible fish is a wicked problem that presents global risks.” (p 301) And yet they suggest that the system might possibly sort itself out. “As fish run out and have to be sustainably fished, the historic underpricing of fish ceases.” (293)

But this is no time for naive optimism, and the system will undoubtedly need some intervention. “When the price is the same as the value, there are opportunities for sustainable financing. So far, price has not equaled value for fish. This is the biggest, wicked decision-making problem of all: knowing how to set a price that equals the value.” (p 295)

In other words, the problem is not just the alarming dwindling of fish stocks but the collective cynicism that not only led to this problem but also amplifies it and resists dealing with it effectively. The key word in the problem statement is the word “set” – even if a few clever people can agree what the right price of fish should be, the real challenge is to set this price into global trading and consumption systems.

Read more »

Co-Production of Strategy and Execution

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#antifragile In my post
Structure Follows Strategy?, I discussed the reciprocal relationship between strategy and structure, and discussed my friend Patrick Hoverstadt’s mission to connect enterprise architects with the strategy processes in an enterprise.

My thoughts about strategy are influenced by Mintzberg, who
sees strategy formulation as an emergent process of trial and error that
takes place during implementation. A company may start with a
broad-brush deliberate strategy, but this strategy often overlooks some
significant issues and risks.

These weaknesses need to be addressed as
part of the execution of the strategy. Thus a more complete and correct
strategy emerges out of the execution process.

Senior
management sometimes take a long time to recognize and acknowledge the
fact that the defacto (emergent) strategy is now better than the
original (deliberate) strategy.
And in some companies the original strategy is so bad, and the
senior management so pig-headed, that there is little chance of a more
sensible strategy emerging.

In order to see strategy and execution as co-evolving, we need to link both strategy and execution to outcomes. If the outcomes turn out unsatisfactory, it is surely a subjective
judgement whether this is blamed on weak strategy or weak execution. And if the overall outcomes turn out to be satisfactory then we may suppose that any weakness in strategy was compensated by excellent execution, and any weakness in execution was compensated by brilliant strategy.

This of course depends on our notion of excellence. Some people might think that perfect execution means doing exactly what it says in the strategy, no more or less. Alternatively, we might define excellence in terms of achieving the best possible outcomes, thus excellent execution may need to depart from the official strategy if that’s what it takes.

Which brings me to Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s notion of antifragility. If fragility means that something is harmed when bad things happen, antifragility means that something becomes better or stronger when bad things happen.

So let me try to apply this notion to the current discussion. A fragile strategy is one that would fail if there are any deviations in execution. A robust strategy is one that would be unaffected by the quality of the execution. And an antifragile strategy is one that would grow better with deviations in execution.

 

Partly based on my contributions to a Linked-In discussion I wonder what the EA team is doing? (One person has deleted his contributions, so the discussion as a whole no longer makes much sense.) See also Fragile Strategy or Fragile Execution? via Storify.

Carole Cadwalladr, Nassim Taleb: my rules for life (The Observer, 24 Nov 2012)

John Crace, Antifragile by Nassim Nicholas Taleb – digested read (The Guardian, 2 Dec 2012)

Conflicting Narratives

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@queenchristina_ writes an excellent article on Google, Starbucks, and Amazon, arguing that “for these multinationals immorality is now standard practice” (Independent 13 November 2012). See also Martin Hickman, Good Bean Counters (Independent 16 October 2012).

It is much too easy for British politicians, journalists and taxpayers to get a sense of moral outrage when they discover how little UK tax these American companies pay on their UK earnings. There may be nothing illegal about the fact that the coffee beans are purchased from a Starbucks subsidiary in Switzerland, or that the UK subsidiary pays a royalty for the use of the Starbucks brand to another Starbucks subsidiary in the Netherlands. By a strange coincidence, the Netherlands charges a very low tax rate on royalty payments. Of course there are many British companies that use similar devices to reduce their UK tax bill.

The word “account” essentially means “story”. The Starbucks accountants have constructed a story in which Switzerland and the Netherlands are essential links in the Starbucks value chain. British politicians have constructed a different story in which Starbucks is ripping off its British hosts. The moral outrage comes from the clash between these two narratives.

When two narratives clash, it seems natural for us to want to impose our preferred narrative on the Other. Wouldn’t it be grand if Starbucks saw the error of its ways and started to pay a fair rate of UK tax. Or wouldn’t it be equally grand if the UK tax laws were changed to regulate against these tax avoidance schemes? Or from Starbuck’s point of view, wouldn’t it be grand if UK corporate tax rates were reduced, so it could simplify its value chain at no cost to its shareholders? (Obviously words like “grand” and “fair” depend on the narrative.)

Of course, what is more likely is that the politicians will issue some threat of tighter regulation, the companies will make some temporary gesture to alleviate public hostility, and that the media will move onto the next target. In the meantime, politicians and the media can make things uncomfortable for corporate executives in the public eye.

And here’s a slightly older example – the attempts by the US Government to hold BP to account for the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. One BP executive complained that “The administration keeps pushing the boundaries on what we are responsible for.” (Wall Street Journal 1 June 2010 via NakedCapitalism)

In any case, there are always going to be conflicting narratives. I was at a workshop in the City this morning discussing how externalities might affect the future of money and the future of commerce. We discussed a range of topics, from mega-cities to carbon trading. 

But what exactly are these externalities? Almost anything that one person thinks to be part of The System and another person thinks to be outside The System. As William P. Fisher, Jr points out, “If we have to articulate and communicate a message that people then have to act on, we remain a part of the problem and not part of the solution.” (Reimagining Capitalism Again, Sept 2011).

Oliver Greenfield identifies the following challenge:

“The externalities created by companies – or, for that matter, nation states – in their pursuit of self-interest can seem rational at the local, country and even regional level.  But at a global level, in a closed system, externalities are costs. What is rational at a company or nation state level is irrational at a global level.” (Green Economy Coalition, April 2012)

Thus we have conflicting narratives, which result from disagreement about system boundaries (including time horizon as a type of boundary). A true systems approach might give us a systematic way of playing contested narratives off against each other.

See also

William P. Fisher, Jr, Question Authority (Oct 2011)

José M. Ramos, Temporalities of the Commons: Toward Narrative Coherence and Strategic Vision (Nov 2012)

Linked-In discussion on Good Bean Counters

and my post on Regulation and Complexity (Oct 2012)