Aggregated enterprise architecture wisdom
Sinan Si Alhir is one of the more prolific tweeters that I follow, and has a perhaps-unfortunate habit of sending out sudden Twitterstreams of valuable insight that really should not be lost to the evanescence of the internet. So, in…
I explained to one of my clients recently that there is a perception of animosity between the Enterprise Architecture community and the Agile community. Both sides make assumptions about the other, often assumptions that are simply unfair. For example, many in the EA community think of “agile practices” as an opportunity to develop software without any architecture at all, while many in the agile software development community think of architecture as one of the “big design up front” guys who oppose their principles and practices. Of course, it is not difficult to find people who fit those unfair descriptions, but I’d like to point out how these two viewpoints are similar.
I believe that effective Enterprise Architecture must be approached from an agile standpoint.
First off, what does it mean to be agile? We can always look to the agile manifesto for some guidance, but more recent publications do a good job of filling in some of the details as well. I include a number of things in the notion of “being agile.” These are not just from the agile manifesto, but also Kanban and the Theory of Constraints, Systems Thinking, Six Sigma, Scrum, eXtreme Programming, and value stream analysis.
I follow the terminology of Sam Guckenheimer in calling this the “Agile Consensus.”
We have to recognize that the “agile consensus” is an approach, not a methodology. It is a way of thinking about dealing with problems. More importantly, it is a way for dealing with complex problems. The diagram below comes from Ken Schwaber (inventor of Scrum) who adapted it from Strategic Management and Organisational Dynamics, by Ralph D. Stacey.
When we look at the problems that software is being used to address, and if we look at the process of writing software itself, we have to recognize that both areas of problems typically fall into the category of “complex.” Not always. Some software is simply configured and configured simply. Some problems that software addresses are simple problems. However, most of the discussions around software development are fueled by people addressing complex problems because that is where most of the software development community works. It is the bread and butter of software development: solving complex problems in a complex way.
Enterprise architecture also deals with complex problems. EA models and information are also complex to build and manage. In this way, EA is very similar to software development. EA solves complex problems in a complex way.
In order for EA to be effective, it has to use the same mentality as agile software development.
When I speak with enterprise architects who are actually doing the job of EA, big themes quickly arise:
If this looks like the list above, that is intentional. I am trying to point out that Enterprise Architects use agile ideas, even if they often don’t use the term “agile” to convey the message.
Why use these techniques? They work for complex problems.
Can someone think of a more complex problem than helping to move an organization towards their goals?
EA addressed complex problems. Agile thinking helps them to do it.
Please join us on Tuesday, January 22 at 9:00 a.m. PT/12:00 p.m. ET/5:00 p.m. GMT for a tweet jam, moderated by Dana Gardner (@Dana_Gardner), ZDNet – Briefings Direct, that will discuss and debate the issues around big data security. Key areas that will be addressed during the discussion include: data security, privacy, compliance, security ethics and, of course, Big Data. Continue reading →
Is a market an organisation, or an enterprise? Seems to me the only valid short-answer is ‘Yes’… Can we design a market? We’d probably say ‘Yes’ there too, though perhaps with a fair few ’It depends…‘ riders attached to that answer. And…
In his presentation on Enterprise Agility at the SCiO meeting yesterday, Patrick Hoverstadt introduced the concept of Yarak.
In falconry, the word Yarak describes a trained hawk that is fit and in a proper condition for hunting. According to the Oxford Dictionary, the word entered the English language in the 19th century, perhaps from Persian yārakī ‘strength, ability’ or from Turkish yaraǧ ‘readiness’.
Patrick explained that Yarak involves a balance between two forces – motivation and strength. The falcon has to be hungry enough to want to hunt, and strong enough to hunt effectively. So the falconer has to get the balance right: too little food and the creature cannot hunt, too much food and it can’t be bothered.
When I talk to people about building organizational intelligence in their own organizations, I hear two forms of resistance. One is that the organization has so little inherent intelligence at present that the task is daunting; the other is that the bosses wouldn’t want it.
When I take examples from glamorous high-tech companies like Microsoft and Google, this can provoke a somewhat fatalist reaction. People say: This kind of intelligence may be all very well for these hi-tech birds of prey, but ordinary companies like us simply don’t have the resources or capability to do any of this stuff.
So it’s important to see examples from ordinary companies as well as from the glamorous ones. Every company has some intelligence, although it may be patchy, fragmented and inconsistent. So we need to find ways of linking and leveraging this intelligence to create a positive spiral of improvement.
As for the question of motivation, there will still be many organizations where the senior management team, perhaps lacking confidence in its own intelligence, will lack enthusiasm for developing intelligence across the rest of the organization. This may be a generation thing – the younger generation of management may be much more comfortable with new styles of management (such as “Theory Y”) as well as with social networking and other technologies.
Does this mean we have to wait for a generation, until the current bosses have shuffled off to the golf course or the Caribbean cruise? Not if the organization can start to develop intelligence in a bottom-up piecemeal fashion. In which case, what matters is the motivation and strength of the people and groups across the organization, and not just the motivation and strength of the bosses. Can we achieve some useful results without top-down support?
In his presentation on Enterprise Agility at the SCiO meeting yesterday, Patrick Hoverstadt introduced the concept of Yarak.
In falconry, the word Yarak describes a trained hawk that is fit and in a proper condition for hunting. According to the Oxford Dictionary, the word entered the English language in the 19th century, perhaps from Persian yārakī ‘strength, ability’ or from Turkish yaraǧ ‘readiness’.
Patrick explained that Yarak involves a balance between two forces – motivation and strength. The falcon has to be hungry enough to want to hunt, and strong enough to hunt effectively. So the falconer has to get the balance right: too little food and the creature cannot hunt, too much food and it can’t be bothered.
When I talk to people about building organizational intelligence in their own organizations, I hear two forms of resistance. One is that the organization has so little inherent intelligence at present that the task is daunting; the other is that the bosses wouldn’t want it.
When I take examples from glamorous high-tech companies like Microsoft and Google, this can provoke a somewhat fatalist reaction. People say: This kind of intelligence may be all very well for these hi-tech birds of prey, but ordinary companies like us simply don’t have the resources or capability to do any of this stuff.
So it’s important to see examples from ordinary companies as well as from the glamorous ones. Every company has some intelligence, although it may be patchy, fragmented and inconsistent. So we need to find ways of linking and leveraging this intelligence to create a positive spiral of improvement.
As for the question of motivation, there will still be many organizations where the senior management team, perhaps lacking confidence in its own intelligence, will lack enthusiasm for developing intelligence across the rest of the organization. This may be a generation thing – the younger generation of management may be much more comfortable with new styles of management (such as “Theory Y”) as well as with social networking and other technologies.
Does this mean we have to wait for a generation, until the current bosses have shuffled off to the golf course or the Caribbean cruise? Not if the organization can start to develop intelligence in a bottom-up piecemeal fashion. In which case, what matters is the motivation and strength of the people and groups across the organization, and not just the motivation and strength of the bosses. Can we achieve some useful results without top-down support?
Following a tweet from Tom Graves, I came acoss this article:
http://continuousdelivery.com/2013/01/on-antifragility-in-systems-and-organiz…
It resonates with a number of my earlier posts:
http://servicefab.blogspot.hk/2009/06/balancing-reliabi…
A little time back, I’m being deliberately vague which is a sin for an architect, to avoid embarrassing the presenter it’s not their fault. I had the somewhat dubious pleasure of attending a vendor briefing. The vendor in question had just been acquired by a very big software company and was on a road trip […]
<p style=”line-height: 18.99147605895996px;”><span style=”font-size: 11px; line-height: 19px;”>This is the fifth posting in our “EA Roadmap for success” series. In this posting we zoom in on the use of an </span><em style=”font-size: 11px; line-height: 19px;”>Open</em><span style=”font-size: 11px; line-height: 19px;”> approach to enterprise architecture.</span></p><p style=”line-height: 18.99147605895996px;”> </p><div class=”captionImage left” style=”width: 600px;”><img class=”left” src=”http://www.bizzdesign.com/assets/BlogDocuments-2/_resampled/resizedimage600375-Enterprise-architecture-roadmap.png” alt=”Enterprise Architecture Roadmap” title=”Enterprise Architecture Roadmap” width=”600″ height=”375″/><p class=”caption”>Enterprise Architecture Roadmap</p></div><h2>Frameworks and approaches?</h2><p style=”line-height: 18.99147605895996px;”>One of the key challenges of getting started with enterprise architecture (EA) is to agree on goals for the EA practice, and subsequently to find and agree on a framework / approach / method that helps the organization to realize those goals.</p><p style=”line-height: 18.99147605895996px;”>In the early days of EA (1990’s and the early 2000’s), we saw many organizations growing their own approaches and frameworks. By working with business sponsors, architects experimented with different processes for EA, frameworks to structure EA products, modeling languages and notation and so on.</p><p style=”line-height: 18.99147605895996px;”>While this worked well in the ‘old days’, many best practices have emerged and ultimately led to the major frameworks / approaches / methods we see today: ArchiMate, TOGAF, IAF, Zachman, DYA, and so on. Some of these are ‘general purpose’, while others (e.g. MODAF/DODAF) appear to be particularly useful in a single branch.</p><h2>Build or Adopt? Open or closed?</h2><p style=”line-height: 18.99147605895996px;”>While organizations in theory face a choice of ‘build or adopt’ where it comes to frameworks, we see that many chose the latter. With all the experiences and best practices that have been developed, most organizations realize that there is little point in re-inventing the wheel all over again.</p><p style=”line-height: 18.99147605895996px;”>The question that remains, then, is this: do we adopt an open approach, or a proprietary / closed approach?</p><p style=”line-height: 18.99147605895996px;”>This question can be answered on many different levels. One could argue that “open vs closed” doesn’t really matter, as long as the selected framework does what it is supposed to do. While this may seem true at first glance, we do believe that there is a lot to be said about principally going for an open approach. The main advantages here are as follows:</p><ul><li>Know what you will get: all details about open frameworks tend to be available in the public domain.</li><li>Choose your partners: because the frameworks are in the public domain, you’ll often be able to select which vendor can help you get started – if needed at all. Along the same lines: if the vendor doesn’t deliver what was requested, switching is easier.</li><li>Get involved: perhaps most importantly, if the framework is lacking in certain areas, organizations can often join and publish their own best practices, furthering the framework for all other users.</li></ul><h2>Adopt as-is, or tailor to specific needs?</h2><p style=”line-height: 18.99147605895996px;”>To conclude this posting: there is one more choice that organizations have to make when adopting a framework, be it an open or a closed/ proprietary one: should we adopt the framework as is, or tailor it to our needs?</p><p style=”line-height: 18.99147605895996px;”> </p><div class=”captionImage left” style=”width: 348px;”><img class=”left” src=”http://www.bizzdesign.com/assets/BlogDocuments-2/Enterprise-architecture-framework.png” alt=”Enterprise Architecture Framework” title=”Enterprise Architecture Framework” width=”348″ height=”400″/><p class=”caption”>Enterprise Architecture Framework</p></div><p style=”line-height: 18.99147605895996px;”>The best practice here is simple: pick and choose! Most approaches explicitly recommend users to tailor the framework to organizational needs. In TOGAF this is being done as part of the <em>preliminary phase</em>. While TOGAF recommends that certain parts <em>not</em> to be skipped, it is of course entirely up to the individual organization to decide what is useful and what is not!</p><h2>Next posting</h2><p style=”line-height: 18.99147605895996px;”>If you’d like to know more, please contact the authors directly at <a title=”b.vangils@bizzdesign.com” href=”mailto:b.vangils@bizzdesign.com”>b.vangils@bizzdesign.com</a> / <a title=”s.vandijk@bizzdesign.com” href=”mailto:s.vandijk@bizzdesign.com”>s.vandijk@bizzdesign.com</a>, or leave a comment. The next post in this series covers project based implementation of EA. It is scheduled to be posted on January 29. </p>
Steve Hilton, David Cameron’s one-time policy adviser currently on mid-term sabbatical in California, has given Stanford students some frank insights into the workings of Government.
I just wanted to make a few comments about collective intelligence and the role of the policy adviser.
Some Prime Ministers and Presidents have had an extraordinary ability to get through large quantities of paperwork and master the critical points. Cameron has many strengths as a leader, but this doesn’t seem to be one of them. As a consequence of this, he is effectively leaving journalists to perform a filtering function – thus he pays attention to an issue only when it is drawn to his attention by the media, and of course, this delayed attention may cause some irritation or embarrassment sometimes. Perhaps a more diligent policy adviser should have picked up some of these issues earlier?
In the system we may infer from Hilton’s description, journalists are not only performing a filtering function but also a sensemaking function. There is clearly a difference between the way a policy looks in some bundle of government papers and how it looks when it appears in the media. Again, we might have expected a diligent policy adviser to have anticipated how policies would appear to the public.
But it seems that the politicians and their advisers don’t control the volume of paperwork they are given to wade through. In his seminar, Hilton dramatically produced a pile of paper one foot high (representing four days committee output), prompting gasps from students. “The idea that a couple of political advisers read through all this and spot things that are bad, things that are contradictory, is just inconceivable”, pleads Hilton.
Of course it is, say members of the previous government including Damian McBride, Gordon Brown’s former political press secretary. Which is why the previous government had a greater number of political advisers, and a coordination process (known as the “grid”) allocating a manageable number of pages to each. McBride acknowledges that the grid sometimes resulted in leaks to journalists, and suggests that Hilton may have downgraded the grid in order to reduce these leaks, but argues that the grid was a key mechanism for effective government and that the problems Hilton complains about are an inevitable consequence of abandoning this mechanism.
It may also be a consequence of regarding the civil service as a malignant force, trying to pull the wool over the politicians’ eyes. (This was a great theme in the original “Yes Minister” series, but has turned into a tired joke in the 2013 series.) Edward Pearce stands up for the independence of the civil service, and complains that it is Hilton who is unrepresentative and unelected.
When Hilton talks about “delivering what we are supposed to be doing”, this presumably refers to some kind of top-down strategic plan, formulated before the election and presented in the manifesto. But this raises some important questions about the relationship between strategy and execution, and the possibility for strategies to emerge and evolve during execution.
Which in turn raises some questions about government as a learning system. Recent governments (including Blair’s New Labour) have had a focus on delivery, which emphasizes single-loop learning – getting better at achieving a fixed set of goals. However, this has to be balanced against double-loop learning – changing the goals to fit changing circumstances.
In an earlier analysis of New Labour and Delivery, two MORI analysts argued that delivery and achievement was at least partially subjective and rhetorical.
Hilton clearly agrees about the importance of external communication. He encourages his students to think about how policies can be “branded”, and suggests that policies often fail not because they weren’t very good policies in the first place but because they are poorly presented. That might be true, but it is also a common excuse: politicians genererally find it easier to admit to errors in presentation than to errors in policy.
Which part of this ecosytem has the longest memory? Presumably the civil servants. And which part has the shortest memory? With some honourable exceptions, probably the media. According to one theory of change, when there are several subsystems operating on different timescales, it is the slowest system that controls the whole. And the Purpose Of the System Is What It Does.
Roger Mortimore and Mark Gill, New Labour and Delivery (IPSOS MORI May 2004)
PM’s aide exposes No 10’s lack of control (Sunday Times, 13 January 2013) (subscription)
John Harlow and Eric Kiefer, Shoes off, feet up, the dude lifts lid on No 10 (Sunday Times, 13 January 2013)
Patrick Hennessy, David Cameron finds out about policies from the newspapers, reveals Steve Hilton (The Telegraph 13 January 2013)
Damien McBride, Whither the Grid? (13 January 2013) Why did the Grid Wither? (14 January 2013)
Edward Pearce, The Unelected (LRB 25 January 2013)
James Tapsfield, Prime Minister often finds out about policies from the radio or newspapers, says former advisor Hilton (The Independent 13 January 2013)
Richard Veryard (ed), Fragile Strategy or Fragile Execution (Storify, December 2012)
Nicholas Watt, David Cameron’s ex-policy guru Steve Hilton criticised over policy remarks (Guardian, 13 January 2013)
updated 25 January 2013
Steve Hilton, David Cameron’s one-time policy adviser currently on mid-term sabbatical in California, has given Stanford students some frank insights into the workings of Government.
I just wanted to make a few comments about collective intelligence and the role of the policy adviser.
Some Prime Ministers and Presidents have had an extraordinary ability to get through large quantities of paperwork and master the critical points. Cameron has many strengths as a leader, but this doesn’t seem to be one of them. As a consequence of this, he is effectively leaving journalists to perform a filtering function – thus he pays attention to an issue only when it is drawn to his attention by the media, and of course, this delayed attention may cause some irritation or embarrassment sometimes. Perhaps a more diligent policy adviser should have picked up some of these issues earlier?
In the system we may infer from Hilton’s description, journalists are not only performing a filtering function but also a sensemaking function. There is clearly a difference between the way a policy looks in some bundle of government papers and how it looks when it appears in the media. Again, we might have expected a diligent policy adviser to have anticipated how policies would appear to the public.
But it seems that the politicians and their advisers don’t control the volume of paperwork they are given to wade through. In his seminar, Hilton dramatically produced a pile of paper one foot high (representing four days committee output), prompting gasps from students. “The idea that a couple of political advisers read through all this and spot things that are bad, things that are contradictory, is just inconceivable”, pleads Hilton.
Of course it is, say members of the previous government including Damian McBride, Gordon Brown’s former political press secretary. Which is why the previous government had a greater number of political advisers, and a coordination process (known as the “grid”) allocating a manageable number of pages to each. McBride acknowledges that the grid sometimes resulted in leaks to journalists, and suggests that Hilton may have downgraded the grid in order to reduce these leaks, but argues that the grid was a key mechanism for effective government and that the problems Hilton complains about are an inevitable consequence of abandoning this mechanism.
It may also be a consequence of regarding the civil service as a malignant force, trying to pull the wool over the politicians’ eyes. (This was a great theme in the original “Yes Minister” series, but has turned into a tired joke in the 2013 series.) Edward Pearce stands up for the independence of the civil service, and complains that it is Hilton who is unrepresentative and unelected.
When Hilton talks about “delivering what we are supposed to be doing”, this presumably refers to some kind of top-down strategic plan, formulated before the election and presented in the manifesto. But this raises some important questions about the relationship between strategy and execution, and the possibility for strategies to emerge and evolve during execution.
Which in turn raises some questions about government as a learning system. Recent governments (including Blair’s New Labour) have had a focus on delivery, which emphasizes single-loop learning – getting better at achieving a fixed set of goals. However, this has to be balanced against double-loop learning – changing the goals to fit changing circumstances.
In an earlier analysis of New Labour and Delivery, two MORI analysts argued that delivery and achievement was at least partially subjective and rhetorical.
Hilton clearly agrees about the importance of external communication. He encourages his students to think about how policies can be “branded”, and suggests that policies often fail not because they weren’t very good policies in the first place but because they are poorly presented. That might be true, but it is also a common excuse: politicians genererally find it easier to admit to errors in presentation than to errors in policy.
Which part of this ecosytem has the longest memory? Presumably the civil servants. And which part has the shortest memory? With some honourable exceptions, probably the media. According to one theory of change, when there are several subsystems operating on different timescales, it is the slowest system that controls the whole. And the Purpose Of the System Is What It Does.
Roger Mortimore and Mark Gill, New Labour and Delivery (IPSOS MORI May 2004)
PM’s aide exposes No 10’s lack of control (Sunday Times, 13 January 2013) (subscription)
John Harlow and Eric Kiefer, Shoes off, feet up, the dude lifts lid on No 10 (Sunday Times, 13 January 2013)
Patrick Hennessy, David Cameron finds out about policies from the newspapers, reveals Steve Hilton (The Telegraph 13 January 2013)
Damien McBride, Whither the Grid? (13 January 2013) Why did the Grid Wither? (14 January 2013)
Edward Pearce, The Unelected (LRB 25 January 2013)
James Tapsfield, Prime Minister often finds out about policies from the radio or newspapers, says former advisor Hilton (The Independent 13 January 2013)
Richard Veryard (ed), Fragile Strategy or Fragile Execution (Storify, December 2012)
Nicholas Watt, David Cameron’s ex-policy guru Steve Hilton criticised over policy remarks (Guardian, 13 January 2013)
updated 25 January 2013
Oh you ponderous and in intellectual trifle lost, knows not of my existence. Should you be conscious, will not I be in your consciousness. The continuum from singularity – Big Bang all the way to Dark Hole all the manifest, past present and future in the whole; is consciousness. The oriental and occidental battled different […]