Aggregated enterprise architecture wisdom
Agility and the Virtual Extended Enterprise
In the 1990s, The Agility Forum of
Lehigh University defined Agility as “The ability to successfully respond to
unexpected challenges and opportunities.” The
forum chartered a technical commi…
Following from that recent series on sensemaking and ‘Seven sins of dubious discipline‘, it seems worthwhile to look at that whole context-space from a different direction, another example of a proven metaframework for much the same kind of metadiscipline – namely…
@antlerboy asks does anyone know theoretical underpinning of the (rather good) police decision-making model?
The National Decision Model (NDM) is a risk assessment framework, or decision making process, that is used by police forces across the UK. It replaces the former Conflict Management Model. Some sources refer to it as the National Decision-Making Model.
Looking around the Internet, I have found two kinds of description of the model – top-down and bottom-up.
The top-down (abstract) description was published by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) sometime in 2012, and has been replicated in various items of police training material including a page on the College of Policing website. It is fairly abstract, and provides five different stages that officers can follow when making any type of decision – not just conflict management.
Some early responses from the police force regarded the NDM as an ideal model, only weakly connected to the practical reality of decision-making on the ground. See for example The NDM and decision making – what’s the reality? (Inspector Juliet Bravo, April 2012).
In contrast, the bottom-up (context-specific) description emerges when serving police officers discuss using the NDM. According to Mr Google, this discussion tends to focus on one decision in particular – to Taser or not to Taser.
“For me the Taser is a very important link in the National Decision Making Model . It bridges that gap between the baton and the normal firearm that has an almost certain risk of death when used.” (The Peel Blog, July 2012). See also Use of Force – Decision Making (Police Geek, July 2012).
ACPO itself adopts this context-specific perspective in its Questions and Answers on Taser (February 2012, updated July 2013), where it is stated that Taser may be deployed and used as one of a number of tactical options only after application of the National Decision Model (NDM).
Of course, the fact that Taser-related decisions have a high Google ranking doesn’t imply that these decisions represent the most active use of the National Decision Model. The most we can infer from this is that these are the decisions that police and others are most interested in discussing.
(Argyris and Schön introduced the distinction between Espoused Theory and Theory-In-Use. Perhaps we need a third category to refer to what people imagine to be the central or canonical examples of the theory. We might call it Theory-in-View or Theory-in-Gaze.)
In a conflict situation, a police officer often has to decide how much force to use. The officer needs to have a range of tools at his disposal and the ability to select the appropriate tool – in policing, this is known as a use-of-force continuum. More generally, it is an application of the principle of Requisite Variety.
In a particular conflict situation, the police can only use the tools they have at their disposal. The decision to use a Taser can only be taken if the police have the Taser and the training to use it properly. In which case the operational decision must follow the NDM.
More strategic decisions operate on a longer timescale – whether to equip police with certain equipment and training, what rules of engagement to apply, and so on. A truly abstract decision-making model would provide guidance for these strategic decisions as well as the operational decisions.
And that’s exactly what the top-down description of NDM asserts. “It can be applied to spontaneous incidents or planned operations by an individual or team of people, and to both operational and non-operational situations.”
Senior police officers have described the use of the NDM for non-conflict situations. For example, Adrian Lee (Chief Constable of Northants) gave a presentation on the Implications of NDM for Roads Policing (January 2012).
The NDM has also been adapted for use in other organizations. For example, Paul Macfarlane (ex Strathclyde Police) has used the NDM to produced a model aimed at Business Continuity and Risk Management. which he calls Defensive Decision-Making.
How does the NDM relate to other decision-making models? According to Adrian Lee’s presentation, the NDM is based on three earlier models:
There is considerable discussion in the USA about the relevance of the OODA loop to policing, and this again focuses on conflict management situations (the “Active Shooter”). There are two important differences between combat (the canonical use of OODA) and conflict management. Firstly, the preferred outcome is not to kill the offender but to disarm him (either physically or psychologically). This means that you sometimes need to give the offender time to calm down, orienting himself into making the right decision. So it’s not just about having a faster OODA loop than the other guy (although clearly some American cops think this is important). And secondly, there is a lot of talk about situation awareness and anticipation. For example, Dr. Mike Asken, who is a State Police psychologist, has developed a model called AAADA (Anticipating, Alerting, Assessing, Deciding and Acting). There is also a Cognitive OODA model I need to look into.
However, I interpret @antlerboy’s request for theoretical underpinning as not just a historical question (what theories of decision-making were the creators of NDM consciously following) but a methodological question (what theories of decision-making would be relevant to NDM and any other decision models). But this post is already long enough, and the sun is shining outside, so I shall return to this topic another day.
Sources
Michael J. Asken, From OODA to AAADA ― A cycle for surviving violent police encounters (Dec 2010)
Adrian Lee, Implications of NDM for Roads Policing (January 2012).
Erik P. Blasch et al, User Information Fusion Decision-Making Analysis with the C-OODA Model (Jan 2011)
National Decision Model (ACPO, 2012?)
National Decision Model (College of Policing, 2013)
SARA model (Center for Problem-Oriented Policing)
@antlerboy asks does anyone know theoretical underpinning of the (rather good) police decision-making model?
The National Decision Model (NDM) is a risk assessment framework, or decision making process, that is used by police forces across the UK. It replaces the former Conflict Management Model. Some sources refer to it as the National Decision-Making Model.
Looking around the Internet, I have found two kinds of description of the model – top-down and bottom-up.
The top-down (abstract) description was published by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) sometime in 2012, and has been replicated in various items of police training material including a page on the College of Policing website. It is fairly abstract, and provides five different stages that officers can follow when making any type of decision – not just conflict management.
Some early responses from the police force regarded the NDM as an ideal model, only weakly connected to the practical reality of decision-making on the ground. See for example The NDM and decision making – what’s the reality? (Inspector Juliet Bravo, April 2012).
In contrast, the bottom-up (context-specific) description emerges when serving police officers discuss using the NDM. According to Mr Google, this discussion tends to focus on one decision in particular – to Taser or not to Taser.
“For me the Taser is a very important link in the National Decision Making Model . It bridges that gap between the baton and the normal firearm that has an almost certain risk of death when used.” (The Peel Blog, July 2012). See also Use of Force – Decision Making (Police Geek, July 2012).
ACPO itself adopts this context-specific perspective in its Questions and Answers on Taser (February 2012, updated July 2013), where it is stated that Taser may be deployed and used as one of a number of tactical options only after application of the National Decision Model (NDM).
Of course, the fact that Taser-related decisions have a high Google ranking doesn’t imply that these decisions represent the most active use of the National Decision Model. The most we can infer from this is that these are the decisions that police and others are most interested in discussing.
(Argyris and Schön introduced the distinction between Espoused Theory and Theory-In-Use. Perhaps we need a third category to refer to what people imagine to be the central or canonical examples of the theory. We might call it Theory-in-View or Theory-in-Gaze.)
In a conflict situation, a police officer often has to decide how much force to use. The officer needs to have a range of tools at his disposal and the ability to select the appropriate tool – in policing, this is known as a use-of-force continuum. More generally, it is an application of the principle of Requisite Variety.
In a particular conflict situation, the police can only use the tools they have at their disposal. The decision to use a Taser can only be taken if the police have the Taser and the training to use it properly. In which case the operational decision must follow the NDM.
More strategic decisions operate on a longer timescale – whether to equip police with certain equipment and training, what rules of engagement to apply, and so on. A truly abstract decision-making model would provide guidance for these strategic decisions as well as the operational decisions.
And that’s exactly what the top-down description of NDM asserts. “It can be applied to spontaneous incidents or planned operations by an individual or team of people, and to both operational and non-operational situations.”
Senior police officers have described the use of the NDM for non-conflict situations. For example, Adrian Lee (Chief Constable of Northants) gave a presentation on the Implications of NDM for Roads Policing (January 2012).
The NDM has also been adapted for use in other organizations. For example, Paul Macfarlane (ex Strathclyde Police) has used the NDM to produced a model aimed at Business Continuity and Risk Management. which he calls Defensive Decision-Making.
How does the NDM relate to other decision-making models? According to Adrian Lee’s presentation, the NDM is based on three earlier models:
There is considerable discussion in the USA about the relevance of the OODA loop to policing, and this again focuses on conflict management situations (the “Active Shooter”). There are two important differences between combat (the canonical use of OODA) and conflict management. Firstly, the preferred outcome is not to kill the offender but to disarm him (either physically or psychologically). This means that you sometimes need to give the offender time to calm down, orienting himself into making the right decision.
And the cop needs to stay calm. George “Doc” Thompson, who taught US police a de-escalation technique known as Verbal Judo, once said “We know that the most deadly weapon we carry is not the .45 or the 9mm, it is in fact the cop’s tongue … A single sentence fired off at the wrong person at the wrong time can get you fired, it can get you sued, it can get you killed.”
So it’s not just about having a faster OODA loop than the other guy (although clearly some American cops think this is important). And secondly, there is a lot of talk about situation awareness and anticipation. For example, Dr. Mike Asken, who is a State Police psychologist, has developed a model called AAADA (Anticipating, Alerting, Assessing, Deciding and Acting). There is also a Cognitive OODA model I need to look into.
However, I interpret @antlerboy’s request for theoretical underpinning as not just a historical question (what theories of decision-making were the creators of NDM consciously following) but a methodological question (what theories of decision-making would be relevant to NDM and any other decision models). But this post is already long enough, and the sun is shining outside, so I shall return to this topic another day.
Sources
Michael J. Asken, From OODA to AAADA ― A cycle for surviving violent police encounters (Dec 2010)
Erik P. Blasch et al, User Information Fusion Decision-Making Analysis with the C-OODA Model (Jan 2011)
Tom Dart, ‘Verbal judo’: the police tactic that teaches cops to talk before they shoot (Guardian 21 July 2016)
Adrian Lee, Implications of NDM for Roads Policing (January 2012).
Steve Papenfuhs, The OODA loop, reaction time, and decision making (PoliceOne, 23 February 2012)
National Decision Model (ACPO, 2012?)
National Decision Model (College of Policing, 2013)
SARA model (Center for Problem-Oriented Policing)
Related Posts
National Decision Model and Lessons Learned (Feb 2017)
Deal and Kennedy (1982) proposed a model of organizational culture, which depended on two factors, risk and the speed of feedback.
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| Source: Deal and Kennedy |
Meanwhile, speed of feedback also affects organizational intelligence. Shorter feedback loops are associated with greater agility and responsiveness, and faster learning, and is a popular meme of the Agile Software movement. Shahzad Bhatti is one of those who emphasizes the link with John Boyd’s OODA loop.
“One of key finding he made was that shorter feedback or iteration loop of OODA with low quality was better than longer or tiring cycle of OODA with high quality. Despite the fact that everyone calls his/her organization agile, this feedback loop is real essense of agility.”
So that seems to associate Agile with the upper two quadrants of the Deal and Kennedy model, and OODA with the top left quadrant.
So then what are the cultural implications of Agile for the host organization?
Notes and references
Lisa Crispin, Shortening the Feedback Loop (March 2011)
Ilan Kirschenbaum, What does a butterfly say at the end of the day? (May 2012)
Rune Larsen, Know your feedback loop – why and how to optimize it (Oct 2012)
Thomas Sundberg, Why should you use different technical practises when you develop software? (April 2011)
Places are still available on my Organizational Intelligence workshop, November 22nd.
#OODA #orgintelligence In response to @Griff0Jones, I promised to beef up the coverage of OODA in my book on Organizational Intelligence (draft now available via LeanPub). I should welcome any comments and suggestions on the following, as well as point…
#OODA #orgintelligence In response to @Griff0Jones, I promised to beef up the coverage of OODA in my book on Organizational Intelligence (draft now available via LeanPub). I should welcome any comments and suggestions on the following, as well as pointers to any practical examples.
The choices we make at the personal level are influenced by our experiences and our environment. We are not always fully aware of these influences, and may need someone else to point them out to us. The same is true of the strategic and operational choices made by organizations.
In a rapidly changing environment, we need a feedback loop that continuously aligns our behaviour to these changes. This is an important aspect of agility. And in a competitive situation, competitive success depends on our being more agile than our competitors – in other words, having a faster and more accurate loop.
A good model for this is the OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) loop created by John Boyd. Some people confuse this with the PDCA (Plan, Do, Check, Act) loop popularized by Shewhart and Deming. However, the key difference between PDCA and OODA is the explicit inclusion of sense-making, which Boyd calls Orientation. Boyd himself produced a second model, IOHAI, which is largely an expansion on the sense-making area.
In order for the OODA loop to produce real agility, there needs to be agility in each of its parts.
Agile Observation. One criticism that has been levelled at simplified versions of the OODA loop (for example Benson and Rotkoff) is the tendency for what you observe to be narrowed to just those things that seem to help with decision making. (David Murphy describes this tendency as “inevitable”.)
Simon Thornington raises a related issue in a comment to David Murphy’s blog. “So much of what is observed is via instrumentation (or alternatively the output of models). Without the observer having prior knowledge of the construction and assumptions of the models, he or she cannot orient effectively based on the observations.” Simon suggests that this was a factor in the recent Airbus crash, various space program mishaps and throughout finance.
But Boyd understood these points perfectly well, as do those who use OODA properly. In his reply to Benson and Rotkoff, David Lyle acknowledges this tendency. “Studies by cognitive neuroscientists have demonstrated that as a basic human trait, we are stressed more by uncertainty than unpleasant certainties. But in our efforts to achieve parsimony and the false cognitive ease often associated with it, we sometimes cut out too much detail and end up building expensive empires on theoretical foundations of sand.” (via Cameron Shaefer)
Agile Orientation. David Murphy points out that “really big risks are often not acted upon because we are oriented so that we cannot decide”, and reminds us what happened to those people who tried to act against the firm’s orientation at MF Global, or Enron or HBOS.
Discussing strategic planning through the OODA lens, Henrik Mårtensson points out the importance of orientation. “If we only know one strategic paradigm, and choose a strategic method from within the range of options provided by the paradigm, we loose (sic) the ability to improve beyond what the paradigm allows. … Boyd believed it is absolutely necessary to be able to switch paradigms at will.”
Agile Decision, Agile Action. Henrik argues that “operating with a crippled OODA loop and a strategic model that separates strategy and action may not kill you, but the faster the environment changes, the more hampered your organization will be by its own strategic model”. Henrik recommends William Dettmer’s Strategic Navigation, which in his opinion combines the principles of Maneuver Warfare with the analysis and planning tools of The Logical Thinking Process. “The result is fast high quality strategic planning, and seamless integration between planning and execution.”
The limitations of the OODA model appear when there is too much emphasis on speed (especially response speed) and not enough appreciation of complexity. For example, in I’ve Got the OODA Blues, Adam Elkis argues as follows.
“Taking the OODA Loop literally can be misleading for cyber defenders because a “faster, faster” model implies that speed of response is the most crucial aspect of network defense. There’s a lot more to it than that. Alex Olesker’s post on Dronegate, for example, is really about a failure of Orientation and an overemphasis on speed of action. The Air Force claimed that it detected the virus instantly and isolated it, in effect placing a premium on the ability of automated processes to improve their ability to instantly observe, orient, decide, and act to contain a virus. This is a response rooted in the “faster, faster” OODA Loop interpretation.”
and Adam concludes
“strategic learning within the organization enables, upon the next cycle, a better ability to Observe, a sounder Orientation, and a corresponding ability to make sounder decisions under fire. This response, however, is not something that can be automated–it depends on organizational policy decisions made by CIOs as well as the soundness of network defense systems and processes.”
Kevin Benson and Steven Rotoff, Goodbye OODA Loop (Armed Forces Journal, October 2011)
David Lyle, Perspectives: Looped Back In (Armed Forces Journal, December 2012)
Blogs by Sean Lawson, Henrik Mårtensson, David Murphy, Chet Richards, and Spartan Cops.
I have added another paper to my list of papers. This one is on the central role of the Enterprise Architect in the Enterprise Portfolio Management Process and how Systems Engineering, System Architecture, and Enterprise Architecture are inter-re…
I have added another paper to my list of papers. This one is on the central role of the Enterprise Architect in the Enterprise Portfolio Management Process and how Systems Engineering, System Architecture, and Enterprise Architecture are inter-re…
I have added another paper to my list of papers. This one is on the central role of the Enterprise Architect in the Enterprise Portfolio Management Process and how Systems Engineering, System Architecture, and Enterprise Architecture are inter-re…
How is it that what we actually do in the heat of the action can differ so much from the intentions and decisions we set beforehand? How can we bring them into better alignment, to ’keep to the plan’? And how does this affect our enterprise-architectures? What we’ve been looking at in this series of posts is […]
@mkplantes sees the demise of Kodak as an intelligence failure.
Put yourself in their Kodak leaders’ chairs for a moment and consider the four expectations of a leadership team and, more importantly, consider the speed with which they had to wo…